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Synchronizing Copyright and Technology:
A New Paradigm for Sync Rights
Michael P. Goodyear*

ABSTRACT
Embedded in a copyright owner’s musical work or sound
recording is the synchronization, or sync right, the exclusive right to
use music in sync, or in timed-relation, with audiovisual works.
Considerations about sync rights, one of the least discussed aspects of
music copyright, have come to the fore as the world has increasingly
moved from the real world to the virtual. The COVID-19 pandemic
has spurred thousands of activities and events to go online. With many
of these involving music, the shift to the virtual world has raised new
questions about the extent of sync rights.
Traditionally, sync rights were meant to require licenses for the
use of music in timed-relation to a film or television show. Charting
the historical trajectory of judge-made sync rights law, this Article
finds that courts have largely continued to confine sync rights to
movies, TV shows, and closely related media. At the edges, however,
courts have started to disagree and many newer forms of audiovisual
work media – such as streaming – have been unexamined, leaving
creators without proper guidance. To help draw some clarity, this
Article hopes to offer the first comprehensive overview of sync right
case law in decades. Drawing from these findings, this Article then
proposes utilizing a two-part test drawn from case law – (1) a
reproduction in an audiovisual work (2) with music played in timedrelation – to limit the boundaries of sync rights and better achieve
balance between rightsholders’ rights and public access to works. In
particular, the timed-relation prong of this test has been largely
ignored, but revitalizing this intent-driven element could provide more
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useful and clearer analysis of sync rights and novel media in the
future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) pandemic forced
the world to go virtual.1 As offices laid empty and entertainment venues
remained shuttered,2 society had to find remote ways to work, play, and
live. COVID-19 forced artists and audiences to adapt, with concerts,
plays, and other forms of entertainment going virtual,3 leading to a surge
in streaming.4 With the vast majority of live events on pause due to the
pandemic, streams on social media and video platforms such as Instagram,
YouTube, and Twitch have become vital for connecting musical artists to
their fans,5 fitness enthusiasts to their instructors,6 and trivia fanatics to
their pub trivia.7 In just the first two months of the COVID-19 quarantine
in the United States, the streaming content sector grew by forty-five
percent.8 By January 2021, 645 billion hours were watched per month on
Twitch, the largest streaming platform.9 At the core of these streaming
industries is music.10

1
See John Seabrook, Has the Pandemic Transformed the Office Forever, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/01/has-thepandemic-transformed-the-office-forever [https://perma.cc/93T6-AHWQ].
2
Id.; Laura Cooper, Live Music Is Back, but New York City Is Barely Rocking,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/live-music-is-back-but-new-york-city-isbarely-rocking-11618246496 [https://perma.cc/P8AV-Y5MK] (last updated Apr. 12,
2021, 4:28 PM).
3
Alan Brandit & Jameson Tibbs, Music Licensing in the Video Streaming Era,
FAY SHARPE, https://faysharpe.com/music-licensing-in-the-video-streaming-era
[https://perma.cc/PKL5-4XMF] (last visited May 11, 2021).
4
Live Streaming Your Show: A 3 Step Copyright Guide, BARBERSHOP
HARMONY SOC’Y (May 19, 2020), https://www.barbershop.org/live-streaming-yourshow-a-guided-copyright-checklist [https://perma.cc/XZ94-HS86].
5
Gwendolyn Seale, Legal Issues in a Livestreaming World, LAW.COM (Jan. 8,
2021, 10:01 AM), https://www.law.com/2021/01/08/legal-issues-in-a-livestreamingworld [https://perma.cc/PA2G-LFAR].
6
Christina Criddle, Coronavirus Creates Boom in Digital Fitness, BBC (Dec.
16,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55318822
[https://perma.cc/U22Y-X3UV].
7
Steven Melendez, From Bar Trivia to Fantasy Role Playing, Zoom Is the
World’s
New
Game
Room,
FAST
CO.
(Apr.
26,
2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90489339/from-bar-trivia-to-fantasy-role-playingzoom-is-the-worlds-new-game-room [https://perma.cc/KH7X-K4WC].
8
Seale, supra note 5.
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Bijan Stephen, In Twitch’s Fight with the Music Industry, Streamers
Are
Paying
the
Price,
VERGE
(Nov.
12,
2020,
3:50
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/12/21562372/twitch-soundtrack-riaa-musicyoutube (noting that thousands of streamers use music).
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In the physical world, musicians, fitness instructors, and others
frequently had to contend with music copyright.11 But with new forms of
media come new questions: “Can I perform a cover song on Instagram?”
“Can I upload a live broadcast of a radio show to YouTube?” “Can I record
my DJ set onto Twitch?” The combination of visual imagery with music
online raises an additional music copyright question: the synchronization
(“sync”) right.12 Judges have interpreted the Copyright Act to give owners
of copyrights in musical works and sound recordings a sync right, an
additional sub-right deriving from the rightsholders’ exclusive
reproduction or derivative works right. This right gives copyright owners
the exclusive right to use music in timed-relation to, or in sync with,
audiovisual works.13
The purpose of synchronization in media creation is to enhance an
audiovisual production by using underlying music to create a specific
effect or mood.14 Synchronization can be a significant addition to a work,
adding a dynamic layer to an artist’s story.15 Courts originally interpreted
sync rights to apply to movies, television shows, and commercials, which
specifically use certain songs at particular moments.16 More recent
jurisprudence has not strayed far from these originally implicated media.17
Yet more novel forms of media, such as on-demand or interactive
11

See, e.g., Joy Butler, Using Music In Your Work: Copyright Tips for
Companies, LAW360 (July 20, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.copyright.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/Using-Music-In-Your-Work-Copyright-Tips-ForCompanies.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9PL-ULUH] (explaining how businesses can
obtain licenses to use music).
12
See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC
MARKETPLACE 55–56 (Feb. 2015) (describing the sync right as deriving from either
the reproduction right, the derivative works right, or a combination thereof). The
reproduction right is the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). The derivative works right is the right “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
13
See Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193 (D. Mass.
2009) (defining the sync right).
14
Theodore Z. Wyman, Enforceability of Synchronization Rights and Licenses
in Copyrighted Music, 84 A.L.R. FED. 2D 345, § 2 (2014) (“Creators of media such as
motion pictures, television programming, TV or radio advertisements, video games,
and karaoke tracks often seek to enhance their productions by synchronizing
underlying music with their audiovisual images for specific effect.”).
15
See Matt Block, When Should You Consider Sync, SONGTRUST,
https://blog.songtrust.com/when-should-you-consider-sync [https://perma.cc/RA9LLBC2] (last updated Apr. 9, 2020) (“[S]ync is an art form that can add a dynamic layer
to an artist’s story while also providing a significant revenue stream.”).
16
See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 n.4 (2d Cir.
1996) (abrogated on other grounds by Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010))
(“Most commonly, synch licenses are necessary when copyrighted music is included
in movies and commercials.”).
17
See infra notes 196–222 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
sync right case law).
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streaming or recorded classes or concerts, also seem to implicate the sync
right as they qualify as audiovisual works.18 As the only wholly
unregulated part of music copyright,19 sync licenses – negotiated
permission to sync a copyrighted work without infringing it – can prove
an enormous burden to prospective creators and new types of media.20
Yet despite the potential hurdles that sync licensing can create for
new technology and innovations, little attention has been paid to sync
rights by either courts or legal scholars. Fewer than two dozen cases have
addressed sync licenses with more than a fleeting mention.21 Extant
18
See Calvin R. Nelson et al., Legal Implications of Syncing Copyright Music
with
Other
Content,
LEXOLOGY
(July
27,
2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4ce6ee91-2404-455a-8f9ed4deecdae617 [https://perma.cc/2KMF-ENA2] (describing sync license issues for
streaming video games and fitness classes).
19
See infra notes 116–29, 154–66 and accompanying text (discussing the
licensing landscape for musical works and sound recordings, including the various
available compulsory licenses).
20
Joseph Storch, Stephanie Morrison & Jack Bernard, Synching Your Teeth
into Copyright Law: Legal and Practical Considerations for Public Performances of
Video and Photos Synchronized to Copyrighted Music, 15 NAT’L ASSOC. COLL. &
UNIV. ATT’YS 1, 9 (May 8, 2017) (noting that obtaining sync licenses can potentially
involve high costs and may require creators to change the songs they use if the price
is untenable); What Is a Synchronization License?, EASY SONG LICENSING,
https://www.easysonglicensing.com/pages/help/articles/music-licensing/what-is-asynchronizationlicense.aspx#:~:text=Challenges%20of%20obtaining%20synchronization%20license
s,and%20reject%20the%20license%20outright (last visited June 2, 2021) (“Note that
synchronization licensing can be challenging because, by law, synchronization rights
holders maintain total control of their works when it comes to video. This means they
can set any fee, take all the time they need, and reject the license outright.”).
21
See generally Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 185, 194
(D. Mass. 2009); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d
Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other grounds by Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010)); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1995); Agee v. Paramount
Comm’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1995); Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 744
F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984); Downtown Music Publ’g LLC v. Peloton Interactive,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co.,
983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc.,
404 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Ohio Players, Inc. v. Polygram Records,
Inc., No. 99-civ-0033, 2000 WL 1616999 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2000); Bourne Co.
v. Walt Disney Co., No. 91 Civ. 0344, 1992 WL 204343 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
1992); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 579 n.3 (6th Cir.
2007); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 481 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2003); House of Bryant Publ’ns, LLC v. A & E Television Networks, No. 3:090502, 2009 WL 3673055 at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2009); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG
Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 2008); Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes
Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1996); Kihn v. Bill Graham Archives,
LLC, 445 F. Supp. 3d 234, 253 (N.D. Cal. 2020); EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis
Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1217. 1221 (D. Utah 2007).
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scholarship on sync rights is even more lacking, with the most detailed
discussions of sync rights coming from student notes. In 1986, Lewis
Rinaudo Cohen provided an overview of the sync right and offered a
reconsideration of it that would weaken music publishers’ claims to re-use
fees and purportedly create better balance between movie producers and
music copyright owners.22 Most of the case law on sync rights occurred
after Cohen’s article was published, however, and it would be three
decades until an academic article directly focused on sync rights would be
published again.23 More recently, Nicholas Thomas DeLisa argued in
favor of a compulsory license system for sync licenses and Hannah
Skopicki suggested requiring sync licenses for hologram performances.24
More practice-focused articles provide analyses of the existing law,25 but
do not suggest how courts should modernize their jurisprudence to address
substantial audiovisual innovations.
This Article hopes to achieve two goals that substantially build on the
limited pre-existing sync right scholarship. First, it offers a thorough
examination of all existing case law on sync rights, providing a muchneeded update to Cohen’s 1986 work. Second, it proposes revitalizing the
evaluation for sync right infringement by parsing a two-part test – the use
must (1) be a reproduction in an audiovisual work and (2) play the music
in timed-relation to moving images – from the case law and giving
requisite weight to the “timed-relation” prong, which has been almost
completely ignored by courts and commentators alike. This test serves the
purpose of copyright by balancing the interests of copyright owners with
public access to new creative works, much in the same vein as other
judicial and legislative adaptations to novel technological innovations.
In Part II, this Article lays out the purposes of copyright, which
provide the overarching guiding principles for copyright law. Part III then
discusses how courts and Congress have historically achieved this purpose
in the face of novel technologies, always keeping an eye towards a balance
between copyright owners’ rights and public access. After establishing
these background considerations, Part IV provides an overview of music
copyright, first describing the overarching musical work and sound
recording rights, and then addressing sync rights specifically. Part V then
analyzes existing sync rights case law to provide an authoritative overview
22
See Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, Note, The Synchronization Right: Business
Practices and Legal Realities, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 787, 805–14 (1986).
23
Id.
24
Nicholas Thomas DeLisa, Note, You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the
Way for Compulsory Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content
Platforms, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1301–12 (2016); Hannah Skopicki, Comment,
Pixelated Poltergeists: Synchronization Rights and the Audiovisual Nature of “Dead
Celebrity” Holograms, 70 AM. U. L. REV. F. 1, 22–29 (2020).
25
See, e.g., Storch, Morrison, & Bernard, supra note 20, at 1 (providing an
overview of when and how to obtain a sync license).
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of the state of the law. After explaining the status quo, Part VI addresses
the historical understanding of sync rights and how novel media forms
have presented new, unanswered complications about where sync rights
begin and end. Finally, Part VII offers a solution to this problem, drawing
inspiration from historical adaptations of copyright to new technologies
while advocating for the simple but effective solution of officially
establishing a two-part test for sync right infringement that has effectively
already been cited by courts, with a particular eye to the timed-relation
prong that has long been relegated to the shadows of infringement
analyses.

II. THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
From the start, copyright has had to balance public access to works
with protecting the rights of copyright owners.26 The goal of copyright, as
articulated by the U.S. Constitution, is “[t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”27 By giving creators a package of exclusive rights, “they are
given an incentive to create.”28 This incentive leads to a proliferation of
creative content, which ultimately, according to this theory, will enrich
public welfare in the United States by achieving progress in the sciences
and arts.29
While these incentives are an important part of copyright law, the
overarching purpose of copyright is to promote the spread of knowledge
and technology.30 Renowned authority on copyright law Melville Nimmer
concluded that the “primary purpose of copyright [i]s not to reward the
author” but promote creation.31 The Supreme Court has similarly
26

Skopicki, supra note 24, at 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29
JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 7–8
(4th ed. 2015). This rationale stretches back to at least the Statute of Anne, an early
British copyright law in the eighteen century from which modern U.S. copyright law
descends. Id. at 24–25; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against
Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 747 (2013).
30
See Malla Pollock, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
“Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 809 (2001) (concluding from
a linguistics study that the term “progress,” as used in the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution, refers to disseminating knowledge and technology); see also
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (recognizing that “dissemination of
creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act”).
31
1 MELLVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (2021).
27
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concluded that promoting access is the ultimate goal of copyright.32 If the
purpose of copyright is to encourage learning33 and progress,34 a policy
emphasis on public access is a logical conclusion.
Thus, access to newly generated knowledge and expression is just as
important as protecting the incentivizing rights of copyright owners. As
articulated by a group of law professors in the Copyright Principles
Project, “[a] well-functioning copyright law carefully balances the
interests of the public and of copyright owners.”35 Courts and Congress
have strived to strike a balance between the two interconnected but often
competing interests of protection and access.36 Particularly with new
technological advancements, it is important to periodically reevaluate
extant copyright law to determine if this balance is met.

III. ADAPTABILITY OF COPYRIGHT LAW TO TECHNOLOGY
Copyright law has always grown and adapted to technological
change. This adaptation is exemplified by how Congress gave more types
of works copyright protection over time.37 The original Copyright Act of
1790 only protected maps, charts, and books.38 But over the course of the
nineteenth century, prints (1802),39 music (1831),40 dramatic compositions
(1856),41 photographs (1865),42 and works of art, including paintings,
drawings, statues, and models (1870) were included within the ambit of
copyright.43 While the inclusion of photographs showed how copyright
could be expanded to include novel types of works, this trend accelerated

32
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(“[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); see also Abend, 495 U.S. at 228
(“[D]issemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act.”).
33
COHEN ET AL., supra note 2929, at 24–25. The Statute of Anne explicitly stated
this. Id.
34
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35
Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for
Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181 (2010).
36
See, e.g., infra Part III.
37
See generally Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject
Matter, 78 PITT. L. REV. 17, 21–27 (2016) (discussing the historical evolution of
copyright subject matter); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208–14 (1954)
(tracing the expansion of copyrighted subject matter in the United States during the
nineteenth century).
38
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
39
Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
40
Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
41
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
42
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
43
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.
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in the twentieth century to include new technological creations. 44 Motion
pictures received independent copyright protection in 1912.45 In 1972, the
Sound Recordings Act granted federal copyright protection to sound
recordings.46 The Copyright Act was amended in 1980 to protect
computer programs.47 Finally, in 1990, copyright was extended to
architectural works.48
But while the ambit of copyright has continued to grow, so have
modifications to the rights of copyright holders in response to
technological development.49 Significant adaptations to copyright took
place in response to the advent of the player piano, television program
retransmission, photocopying, home video recording equipment, and a
myriad of Internet innovations such as Google Books.50 For all of them,
the goal was striking a balance between copyright holders’ exclusive rights
and public access.51
One of the earliest twentieth century modifications to exclusive rights
in the Copyright Act in response to technology was the mechanical
license.52 In 1900, Edwin S. Votey received a patent for the player piano,
or pianola.53 The player piano was a self-playing piano which contained
a pneumatic mechanism which “read” programmed music recorded on
perforated paper.54 Votey later gave his patent rights to the Aeolian
Company, of which he was a director.55 The player piano enjoyed
considerable popularity, selling over 200,000 units per year.56 But this
new form of musical performance threatened the rights of musical work
44

See., e.g., Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
Id. They previously were only copyrightable by depositing a series of still
photographs. See Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 240–43 (3d Cir. 1903) (holding that a
series of 4,500 pictures was copyrightable as a “photograph”).
46
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. Sound
recordings made prior to 1972, however, were still only protected by state law, where
applicable, until the Music Modernization Act added federal protection for pre-1972
sound recordings in 2018. Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018).
47
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
48
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–
704, 104 Sat. 5089, 5133 (1990).
49
See infra notes 54–94 and accompanying text.
50
See infra notes 54–94 and accompanying text.
51
See infra notes 54–94 and accompanying text.
52
Lydia Pallas Loren, The Dual Narratives in the Landscape of Music
Copyright, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 537, 545–47 (2014).
53
U.S. Patent No. 650,285 (filed Jan. 25, 1897) (issued May 22, 1900).
54
Player Piano History & Development, PLAYER PIANO PAGE,
http://www.pianola.com/pphist.htm [https://perma.cc/DQX2-7JFN] (last revised Jan.
25, 2006).
55
Loren, supra note 52, at 546.
56
Id.
45
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copyright owners.57 To play a song, the player piano required a roll of
paper that had been perforated in line with the music – effectively a code
for the piano player to follow.58 Aeolian produced millions of these rolls
to feed the popularity of the player piano.59 Yet these rolls were quite
distinct from the sheet music that came before, whose reproduction was
undoubtedly the exclusive prerogative of the copyright owner.60
In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether these rolls
infringed upon the rights of the owners of copyrights in musical works.61
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the Court held that the
rolls were not copies of the musical works, and therefore there was no
infringement.62 This ruling could have seriously harmed composers, and
the Supreme Court acknowledged that this ruling effectively allowed freeriding by the player piano companies.63 In response, Congress included a
provision in the 1909 Copyright Act that granted the copyright owner of a
musical work the right to control mechanical reproductions of that work,
subject to a compulsory mechanical license.64 This preserved the revenue
stream of composers and, for the first time in the history of U.S. copyright
law, subjected a copyright owner to a compulsory license.65 The purpose
of this mechanical license, now codified in Section 115 of the Copyright
Act, was to readjust the balance in music copyright law after White-Smith

57

Id.
History of the Pianola – Music Roll Manufacture, PIANOLA INST.,
http://www.pianola.org/history/history_rolls.cfm
[https://perma.cc/L4RL-2RGX]
(last visited May 21, 2021).
59
Id. (“It was an accepted maxim amongst Aeolian Company staff that its profits
came from the sale of instruments, and that rolls were manufactured as a means to that
end.”); Loren, supra note 52, at 546 (“[O]ver five million rolls [were] sold each
year.”).
60
Loren, supra note 52, at 546.
61
White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908).
62
Id. at 18.
63
Id. (“It may be true that the use of these perforated [player piano] rolls, in the
absence of statutory protection, enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of
musical compositions for which they pay no value.”).
64
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (“That whenever the owner
of a musical copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of
the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically
the musical work, any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work
upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of two cents on each such
part manufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof.”).
65
Loren, supra note 52, at 547 (“[F]or the first time in the history of U.S.
copyright law, Congress subjected this new right granted to the copyright owner to a
compulsory license.”); Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 215, 219–21 (2010) (discussing the background and
establishment of the Section 115 mechanical license).
58
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was decided and protect both copyright owners and access to creative
works.66
Congress stepped in again when technological advances allowed the
retransmission of television signals. 67 In two cases in 1968 and 1974, the
Supreme Court held that amplification of an existing broadcast by
retransmission through cable did not constitute a public performance.68 In
the latter decision, the Supreme Court noted, like it had in White-Smith,
that the Copyright Act was outdated and had not kept pace with new
technologies, such as cable television (“CATV”).69 Congress took note
and again overhauled the Copyright Act in 1976. One of Congress’ main
reasons for this substantial change was to overturn these decisions and
reestablish a balance that protected copyright owners’ rights.70 The result
was a similar compromise to that of 1909.71 Congress redefined a public
performance of an audiovisual work as “show[ing] its images in any
sequence or to make sounds accompanying it audible” and enacted the
Transmit Clause, which together made retransmissions performances
subject to copyright.72 However, Congress also created a compulsory
licensing scheme for cable systems to retransmit broadcasts.73 Again,
Congress had balanced the rights of the copyright holder and access to the
works.74
But not all modifications to copyright law to accommodate
technological change relied on compulsory licenses.75 In the case of
photocopying, fair use provided protection for users.76 Hand copying of
66
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1626–27 (2001); see also Abrams, supra
note 65, at 220 (explaining how a mechanical reproduction right without a compulsory
license would have created conditions for a potential monopoly).
67
Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 1627.
68
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400–401
(1968) (“We hold that CATV operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not
perform the programs that they receive and carry.”); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408, 412–15 (1974) (“The reception and rechanneling
of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective
of the distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.”).
69
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414.
70
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 439–41 (2014) (explaining why
and how Congress rejected the holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter).
71
See id.
72
Id. at 441–42.
73
Id. at 442.
74
See id.
75
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107.
76
Fair use is one of the statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner. Id. Fair uses of a copyrighted work – as determined by a four-factor
test evaluating the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted
work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the potential
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articles had been considered outside of the scope of U.S. copyright law.77
But the introduction of the Xerox photocopier in the 1960s and the
subsequent profusion of billions of photocopies raised anew concerns by
publishers about the lack of copyright protection against photocopying.78
In particular, publishers of periodical journals – which were until then
usually only available through a subscription or purchased as an expensive
single back issue – worried that potential consumers could obtain free
photocopies from the library rather than pay the market price.79 Even if a
single photocopy could be a benign use, billions of photocopies in the
aggregate posed a significant problem to these publishers.80 For example,
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, scientific journal publishers
presented evidence that in 1970 the National Library of Medicine and the
National Institutes of Health filled requests for 93,000 photocopies of
articles per year – articles that would have otherwise been purchased.81
The Court of Claims found the photocopying at issue to be fair use, but
cited White-Smith and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.
and echoed the Supreme Court in those cases, encouraging Congress to act
to address these technological advancements.82 In response, Congress
included Section 108 in the 1976 Copyright Act, which carved out a
specific exemption from copyright liability for library copying in certain
circumstances.83 While this provided some much-needed guidance, courts
continue to attempt to maintain balance by addressing how photocopying
technology, and its modern corollary of scanning, squares with fair use.84

market for the work – are not considered infringements. Id. Examples of fair use
include criticism, parody, comment, news reporting, and scholarship. Id.
77
Louise Weinberg, The Photocopying Revolution and the Copyright Crisis,
PUB. INT. 99 (Winter 1975).
78
Id. at 100.
79
Id. at 104.
80
See id. at 108 (explaining that even if an individual act of photocopying was
fair use, many individuals undertaking that act posed a different problem).
81
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff’d 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
82
Id. at 1362–63 (“Hopefully, the result in the present case will be but a ‘holding
operation’ in the interim period before Congress enacts its preferred solution.”).
83
17 U.S.C. § 108 (2018) (“[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for a library
or archives, or any of its employees acting within the scope of their employment, to
reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c), or to distribute such copy or phonorecord, under the conditions
specified by this section.”).
84
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1271–75 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that in evaluating a scanned document under the third factor of the fair use
test, the court must consider the quantity and quality of the copied portion rather than
a fixed 10% of the work figure); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
931 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the photocopying of scientific articles was not fair
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The trend of adapting copyright to new technologies continued after
the 1976 Act was passed.85 In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme
Court remarked that “the law of copyright has developed in response to
significant changes in technology.”86 The Court faced such a significant
change in that case, in which it needed to answer whether videotape
recorders violated copyright law.87 The Sony court held that new
technologies that were “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” such
as the Betamax video recorder, did not constitute copyright infringement.88
Indeed, time-shifting – changing the time when someone viewed a
program – actually yielded social benefits by furthering access to the
copyrighted work and was a fair use.89
Perhaps the greatest challenge for copyright law, however, was the
Internet. This monumental change gradually spurred the courts and
Congress to address the novel questions posed by it. In 1998, Congress
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in response to the Internet,
which established safe harbors for websites with third-party content as
long as they follow a statutorily required notice and takedown regime.90
In decisions around the country, courts held that novel online uses such as
thumbnail images in searches and online searchable books qualified as fair
use.91 Many other cases also addressed copyright in the era of the Internet,
attempting to strike the right balance.92 Then, in 2018, Congress passed
use because it copied the entire articles for the purpose of multiplying the number of
copies in their possession, which harmed licensing and subscription revenue).
85
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–58
(1984).
86
Id. at 430.
87
Id. at 419.
88
Id. at 442, 456. It further held that the unauthorized home time-shifting of
television programs was fair use. Id. at 455.
89
Id. at 455.
90
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860.
91
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that Google’s use of copyrighted thumbnails in its search engine was fair
use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
use of copyrighted images as thumbnails in a search engine was fair use); Authors
Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 225 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Google’s
digitization of books was a transformative use because it balanced providing access
via its search function while limiting that access in a way that did not usurp the
copyright owners’ market); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 101 (2d
Cir. 2014) (holding that libraries’ digitization of copyrighted works for the purpose of
permitting full-text searches was fair use).
92
See, e.g., Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1209 (2021)
(holding that “where Google reimplemented a user interface, taking only what was
needed to allow users to put their accrued talents to work in a new and transformative
program, Google’s copying of the Sun Java API was a fair use of that material as a
matter of law”); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir.
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the Music Modernization Act in response to, inter alia, interactive music
streaming platforms such as Spotify and Apple Music substantially
changing the music licensing landscape.93
Modifications to copyright law such as these have been critical for
preserving the balance between copyright holders’ rights and public
access.94 This historical trend of courts and Congress adapting copyright
to new technologies is needed once again. As will be explored in this rest
of this Article, copyright owners’ synchronization rights now encompass
a much wider range of content than was originally envisioned by the
courts, suggesting a need for rebalancing.

IV. MUSIC COPYRIGHT AND SYNC RIGHTS
To understand sync rights, the reader must first apprehend the
broader landscape of music copyright. Accordingly, this section first
provides an overview of copyrights in musical works and sound recordings
before then describing sync rights.

A. Musical Works and Sound Recordings
Synchronization, and the music copyright law in which it is housed,
only makes up a discreet corner of the copyright universe. Copyright law
protects authored original creative works fixed in tangible form.95 The
Copyright Act grants copyright protection to eight categories of works of
authorship: (1) literary works, (2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7)
sound recordings, and (8) architectural works.96 Copyright owners of
these works are entitled to a set of exclusive rights, the exact set varying
depending on the type of work: (1) reproduction, (2) preparation of
2018) (holding that the first sale doctrine did not apply to the sale of music files
through ReDigi); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)
(“holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”).
93
See Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018); The Creation of the Music Modernization Act, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/creation.html
[https://perma.cc/N776-EZ65] (last visited June 12, 2021) (“The late 20th and early
21st centuries saw the rise of the internet and the advent of online music distribution
and streaming services using pre-internet laws. Specifically, the rise of interactive
streaming services such as Spotify or Apple Music exposed a significant gap in the
licensing system for musical works.”).
94
Id.
95
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
96
Id.
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derivative works, (3) distribution, (4) public performance, (5) public
display, and (6) public performance by means of a digital audio
transmission.97 The copyright owner also has the right to convey each of
these exclusive rights separately.98
Out of these eight categories of works, music copyright is a
particularly complicated area of law due to the many rights potentially
implicated and the complicated licensing regimes that govern them.99
First, a work of music contains two separate copyrights: the musical work
and the sound recording.100 A musical work is a composition: the notes,
rhythms, and lyrics that comprise a song. 101 For example, the lyrics and
music Bob Dylan wrote for the 1967 song “All Along the Watchtower”
form a musical work.102 The author of a musical work possesses five of
the six rights enumerated in the Copyright Act: (1) reproduction, (2)
preparation of derivative works, (3) distribution, (4) public performance,
and (5) public display.103
A sound recording, on the other hand, is the fixed performance of the
musical work in a physical medium, such as a CD or digital music file. 104
For example, “All Along the Watchtower” was performed by Dylan and
later by Jimi Hendrix.105 Assuming for the purposes of this example that
both works were recorded after 1972,106 a digital recording of the song by
Dylan contains Dylan’s copyrights in both the underlying musical work
and his sound recording.107 Hendrix’ rendition, however, is comprised of
Hendrix’ copyright in the sound recording and Dylan’s copyright in the
97

17 U.S.C. § 106.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
99
See
Types
of
Copyright,
BMI,
https://www.bmi.com/licensing/entry/types_of_copyrights [https://perma.cc/2BBF4LCT] (last visited May 11, 2021); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 112, 114–115 (2018)
(explaining the rights of copyright owners and the compulsory licenses available for
musical works and sound recordings).
100
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 16.
101
Musical Works, Sound Recordings & Copyright, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1,
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/sound-recordings-vs-musicalworks.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTY6-Y53P] (last revised Feb. 2020).
102
Steve Masur, Understanding the Two Types of Copyright in Music, MGA
(Feb.
11,
2011),
https://masur.com/songs-and-records-two-types-of-musiccopyrights/#:~:text=As%20the%20songwriter%2C%20Bob%20Dylan,%2C%5B3%
5D%20is%20paid [https://perma.cc/Y85T-RH8M].
103
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 25.
104
Musical Works, supra note 101, at 2.
105
Masur, supra note 102.
106
The Copyright Act does not subject sound recordings fixed prior to February
15, 1972, to the usual § 106 protections of federal copyright law, but, following the
Music Modernization Act, it provides the same federal remedies for unauthorized uses
of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 1401 (2018).
107
Id.
98
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musical work, and Dylan’s sound recording is not implicated.108 This is
because the rights of the sound recording copyright owner “do not extend
to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such
sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”109
Instead, that exact recording – not just a similar sounding soundtrack –
must be used to implicate the copyright in the sound recording.110
Additionally, the rights encompassed in a sound recording copyright are
slightly more limited than those in a musical work.111 The author of a
sound recording only has the exclusive right to: (1) reproduce, (2) prepare
derivative works, (3) distribute, and (4) publicly perform by means of a
digital audio transmission, which does not include terrestrial broadcasts.112
As most digital music consists of a sound recording, playing such a
recording usually implicates both the copyright in the sound recording and
in the underlying musical work.113 Depending on the use of that music,
the user will often need to license several copyright rights.114 For example,
if one wanted to play Hendrix’s cover of “All Along the Watchtower” at a
party in New York’s Central Park on a CD version burned from Hendrix’s
cover, they would need to obtain three copyright licenses: (1) the right to
reproduce Dylan’s musical work; (2) the right to publicly perform Dylan’s
musical work; and (3) the right to reproduce Hendrix’s sound recording.115
This series of required licenses could present a significant barrier for
a potential user. For most types of copyrights, licenses are individually
negotiated, which would require contacting Dylan and Hendrix (or rather,
Hendrix’s estate) and hammering out agreeable terms.116 Music copyright,
however, has a series of compulsory licenses that have been established
by Congress and third-party intermediaries that serve as clearinghouses for
licenses.117 Section 115 of the Copyright Act – created in the wake of
White-Smith – establishes a compulsory license for the reproduction and

108

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2018).
110
Id.
111
7 U.S.C. § 114(d)(4)(B).
112
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 43.
113
Masur, supra note 102.
114
See id.
115
Note that because the sound recording public performance right only applies
to performances via digital audio transmissions, it is not implicated in a live
performance in Central Park.
116
See Brian T. Yeh, Copyright Licensing in Music Distribution, Reproduction,
and Public Performance, CONG. RES. SERV. 4 (Sept. 22, 2015) (“Some licenses are
negotiated instruments between a copyright holder and a third party. . . . Other licenses
are created by statute.”).
117
See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018).
109
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distribution of musical works.118 Section 115 also establishes set rates for
the mechanical reproduction of music, as determined by the Copyright
Royalty Board (“CRB”) and reviewed every five years.119 Compulsory
licenses do not exist for the musical work public performance right,
although there are consent decrees imposed upon the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music,
Inc. (“BMI”) that effectively establish compulsory licensing upon
request.120 Section 114 contains a compulsory license for the public
performance of sound recordings for satellite and non-interactive
streaming services, and Section 112 contains reproduction and distribution
licenses under certain circumstances for ephemeral copies created by such
services, and both also have rates set by the CRB every five years.121
Although these compulsory license regimes are important,122 in
reality, most prospective licensees obtain licenses through third-party
collective rights organizations that serve as clearinghouses for the various
rights encompassed by music copyright.123 Most one-off mechanical
musical work reproduction and distribution licenses are acquired through
the Harry Fox Agency.124 For musical work public performance rights,
four performing rights organizations (“PROs”) 125 – ASCAP, BMI,
SESAC, and Global Music Rights (“GMR”) – offer licenses.126 Sound
recording public performance rights for digital non-interactive services are
administered by SoundExchange.127 The only one of these rights to not
have a collective rights organization is the sound recording copyright
owner’s reproduction/distribution right, although record labels usually
118

Id.
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 802(b) (2018); see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 12, at 27–29.
120
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 34, 37 (noting that, under the
consent decrees, ASCAP and BMI “must grant a license to any user that applies, on
terms that do not discriminate against similarly situated licensees”).
121
17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114, 802(b).
122
For example, even if most would-be licensees do not take advantage of the
statutory licenses, these licenses can still operate as effective rate caps on the
negotiated rates. Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72
STAN. L. REV. 915, 938 (2020)
123
These are popular because having the licenses available at a central location
significantly lowers transaction costs. See Loren, supra note 52, at 539 (“The resulting
exceedingly high transaction costs are ameliorated through different collective rights
management systems.”); Victor, supra note 122, at 955 (“The PROs’ rights
aggregation . . . is the quintessential example of a transaction-cost-saving licensing
technique.”).
124
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 21.
125
Id. at 3. Which are also referred to as collective management organizations
(“CMOs”).
126
Id. at 20.
127
Id. at 22.
119
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license these rights.128 Overall, these collective rights organizations
process most of the musical work and sound recording licenses in the
United States, although some copyright owners will still have prospective
licensees negotiate directly with them, their publishers, or their labels.129

B. The Synchronization Right
As demonstrated in the previous section of this Article, the music
copyright landscape is quite complex with the panoply of rights and
licensing structures articulated in the Copyright Act.130 In addition to these
explicit rights, however, is an additional, unwritten one: the
synchronization, or “sync” right.131 Sync rights appear nowhere in the
Copyright Act or any other statute.132 However, courts have recognized
sync rights as exclusive rights of the copyright owner.133 Specifically, they
have interpreted sync rights to flow from the copyright owner’s Section
106 reproduction right and/or derivative works right.134 Sync rights are,
however, independent of public performance rights.135
Courts have defined synchronization as the use, or reproduction, of
music in “timed-relation” to audiovisual works such as films or
videotapes.136 For example, a sync right is “the right to synchronize . . .

128
See id. at 43 (Licenses to reproduce and distribute sound recordings “are
obtained through direct negotiation between a licensee and the sound recording
owner.”).
129
See id. at 30–31 (“Although the use of the section 115 statutory license has
increased in recent years with the advent of digital providers seeking to clear large
quantities of licenses, mechanical licensing is still largely accomplished through
voluntary licenses that are issued through a mechanical licensing agency such as HFA
or by the publisher directly.”).
130
Wyman, supra note 14.
131
Id.
132
Id.; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir.
2008).
133
Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 527.
134
See, e.g., Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984)
(describing the sync right as a form of the reproduction right); Peter DiCola & David
Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397, 408 (2014)
(describing the sync right as implicating the derivative works right); REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 55–56 (describing the sync right as deriving from either
the reproduction right, the derivative works right, or a combination thereof).
135
Affiliated Music Enters. Inc., v. Sesac, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 865, 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), aff’d, 268 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp.
843, 846 (D. Minn. 1948).
136
See Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193 (D. Mass.
2009); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 33 n.23 (1979); Leadsinger, 512
F.3d at 527.
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music with [a] film.” 137 A separate right exists for both musical works and
sound recordings.138 For musical works, a sync right is implicated
wherever a composition is used in timed-relation with an audiovisual
work.139 The owner of a copyright in a sound recording also has a
synchronization right, as “the statutory language pertaining to the sound
recording reproduction right is broad enough to include a synch right.” 140
If a specific copyrighted sound recording is synched to an audiovisual
work, then the sync right in the sound recording (more commonly referred
to as the “master use” right) is invoked.141
In addition to the copyright licenses previously described,142 a
prospective user must therefore obtain a “synch license if an existing
musical composition is to be used in synchronization or ‘timed-relation’
with an audiovisual work, such as a theatrical or television motion picture
or commercial.”143 As there are two distinct sync rights in both musical
works and sound recordings, prospective licensees must potentially
confront obtaining licenses from both copyright owners.144 These licenses
are crucial to industries such as television and movies, which are perhaps
their most common use.145 These rights are at the center of music being
137
Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 884 (9th
Cir. 1996).
138
Wyman, supra note 14, at § 2; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water
Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 481 n.8 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n entity wishing to synchronize
music with visual images in a video, motion picture, etc., must obtain a
synchronization license from the musical composition copyright holder and must also
obtain a license from the sound recording copyright holder.”).
139
Common
Licensing
Terms
Defined,
ASCAP,
https://www.ascap.com/help/ascap-licensing/licensing-termsdefined#:~:text=A%20synchronization%20or%20%22synch%22%20right,music%2
0video%20or%20commercial%20announcement.&text=Synchronization%20rights
%20are%20licensed%20by,of%20the%20movie%20or%20program
[https://perma.cc/5SLL-AYKF] (last visited May 18, 2021).
140
Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also Ohio Players, Inc. v. Polygram Records, Inc., No. 99CIV.0033, 2000 WL
1616999, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
141
See Agee, 59 F.3d at 322.
142
See supra Part IV(a).
143
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
30.02[F][3] (2021); see also Darren M. Richard, Music Licensing 101: A Legal Guide
for
Creators
of
Motion
Pictures,
INDIE
SLATE
(Oct.
2011),
https://www.dinsmore.com/content/uploads/2017/06/indie20slate20-20richard.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3WB-974A] (“When seeking to use a specific master sound
recording that embodies a specific artist’s performance of a musical composition, a
licensee must, in addition to clearing the rights for the composition, obtain a ‘master
use’ license.”).
144
Richard, supra note 143.
145
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 n.4 (2d Cir.
1996).
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integrated into a film.146 For example, the movie Eurovision Song Contest
likely had to license copyrighted songs such as ABBA’s “Waterloo,” but
likely not original songs specifically commissioned for the movie, such as
“Double Trouble,” which would presumably be works for hire.147
Similarly, a sing-along videocassette with songs from Disney hits such as
Pinocchio coordinated to play with video clips clearly implicates a sync
right.148
While the sync right for musical works is implicated wherever a
composition is synched with an audiovisual work, the sound recording
sync right only applies when a specific copyrighted recording is used.149
If an original cover of a song is created for the audiovisual work, only the
musical work is implicated.150 However, if a specific sound recording is
used, the sync rights in the sound recording must also be cleared through
a “master use” license, which allows the licensor to synchronize the sound
recording in timed-relation with the relevant audiovisual work.151
Similarly to the sync license, the master use license allows the licensee to
use the sound recording in an audiovisual work and make copies of the
audiovisual work.152 A key task for a producer, therefore, is “obtain[ing]
authorization from the owner of a sound recording before reproducing that
recording in the soundtrack of an audiovisual work.”153
Sync and master use licenses are required for the full creation of
many audiovisual works, and this can pose a significant hurdle to

146
M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Minn. 1948) (noting
that through these copyright licenses “music by such synchronization will be
integrated with the film”).
147
See Elena Nicolaou, The Songs on Netflix’s Eurovision Soundtrack Are
Destined
to
Be
Hits,
OPRAH
DAILY
(June
29,
2020),
https://www.oprahdaily.com/entertainment/a33000216/eurovision-movie-soundtrack
[https://perma.cc/6K2X-7NTH] (listing the songs in the movie, including both
copyrighted songs necessitating a sync license and original songs); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2018) (defining a work for hire, including for “a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work”).
148
See Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 91 Civ. 0344 (LLS), 1992 WL
204343, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1992).
149
Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 768 (E.D. Mich.
2008).
150
Id.
151
Tuneen E. Chisolm, In Lieu of Moral Rights for IP-Wronged Music Vocalists:
Personhood Theory, Moral Rights, and the WPPT Revisited, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
453, 466 (2018) (“[I]f-and only if-a copyrighted sound recording is used, a master
license for the use of the sound recording is also required.”); Richard, supra note 143.
152
Richard, supra note 143; see also Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,
566 F. Supp. 226, 226-27 (D.N.J. 1983) (“Under this Agreement Chess Janus gave
Lucasfilm the right to use the ‘master recordings’ or ‘matrixes’ of four popular songs
for use on the soundtrack of the motion picture American Graffiti.”).
153
Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1995).
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producers and others.154 Unlike some other music copyright rights, there
is no regulation of sync licenses, so the prices of these licenses are
negotiated solely on the open market.155 In addition, while the musical
work reproduction and distribution rights and digital non-interactive
performances of sound recordings all have compulsory licenses, sync
rights do not.156 Instead, whoever wants to sync music to an audiovisual
work must obtain a sync license on the open market at the whim of the
copyright owner.157 Due to this lack of regulation, sync licenses, although
they are usually one-time flat fees, can vary wildly in amount, from a
nominal sum to tens of thousands of dollars or more for including it in an
audiovisual work; or a rights owner can simply refuse to allow the use of
their song or recording.158
In addition, it can be difficult to find who possesses the sync right
and contact them.159 If someone wishes to use a musical work or a sound
recording in their audiovisual work, they generally need to negotiate
directly with either the author or artist directly, or their publisher or record
label.160 Unlike other music rights, there are no official “clearinghouses”
or collective rights organizations in the United States for sync licenses,161
although some entities have started to offer such services on a smaller
scale.162 For example, PretzelAux offers a library of music that allows
154

See Richard, supra note 143.
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 56; RUDOLF LEŠKA, DIGITAL
PERIPHERIES: THE ONLINE CIRCULATION OF AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT FROM THE SMALL
MARKET PERSPECTIVE 277 (Petr Szczepanik et al., eds., 2020) (describing the role of
collective management organizations in music licensing for film).
156
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 56.
157
Kihn v. Bill Graham Archives, LLC, 445 F. Supp. 3d 234, 253 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (on appeal) (Synchronization licenses “are voluntary and negotiated, not
compulsory.”); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 56.
158
Richard, supra note 143 (“The fees can range from nominal amounts to tens
of thousands of dollars depending upon the specific rights needed, the scope and
budget of the project, and the relative leverage and bargaining power of the parties
involved.”).
159
See Live Streaming Your Show, supra note 4.
160
See Leška, supra note 155, at 277 (Petr Szczepanik et al., eds., 2020) (“Unless
the rightsholder appoints a CMO to administer the synchronization right . . . the
producer needs to seek synchronization approval directly from the publisher or, if
there is no publisher, the author.”).
161
Peter K. Yu, How Copyright Law May Affect Pop Music Without Our
Knowing It, 83 UMKC L. REV. 363, 387, 392 (2014) (“[N]o U.S. CMO has thus far
been established to grant synchronization licenses to audiovisual contents, such as
MTV or YouTube videos.”).
162
Live Streaming Your Show, supra note 4, (“Unfortunately there are no official
US ‘clearinghouses’ available to easily secure synchronization licenses; however,
independent entities offering these services can be found by an internet search using
key phrases such as ‘synchronization license services’ or ‘synchronization clearance
services.’”).
155
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streamers to play their music on their audiovisual work.163 Other
intermediaries also exist,164 but in a much more segmented market than the
other collective rights organization-dominated music licenses. Larger
entities have entered into direct relationships with music publishers, such
as YouTube, which licenses sync rights for user-uploaded videos on its
platform,165 but this is not the case for smaller licensees or licensors, for
whom it is much less common to appoint a collective rights organization
to administer their sync rights.166

V. SYNC RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
In addition to sync rights being difficult for creators and users to
understand and license, there is limited guidance on them. Compared to
many areas of copyright law, sync rights have gotten short shrift in
scholarship and in the courts. Historically, scholars have given little
consideration to sync rights, with only three law review articles primarily
discussing U.S. sync rights.167 Several hundred-page copyright law
casebooks gloss over sync rights in a few sentences.168 Even Melville and
David Nimmer, in their leading copyright treatise, provide few insights
into the confines of sync rights, limiting their commentary primarily to
contractual terms for sync licenses.169

163
What Is Pretzel?, PRETZEL, https://www.pretzel.rocks/for/livestreamers
[https://perma.cc/JS8C-KPAV] (last visited May 11, 2021).
164
See,
e.g.,
Jay
Rosenthal
&
Christos
P.
Badavas, Additional Comments of the National Music Publishers’ Association, Inc.
and the Harry Fox Agency, Inc. in Response to July 23, 2014 Second Notice of
Inquiry, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, MUSIC LICENSING STUDY:
COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE JULY 23, 2014 REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS DUE ON SEPT. 12, 2014 (2014) (citing examples such
as the Harry Fox Agency, Greenlight Music, Dashbox, Songfreedom, CueSongs,
SynchTank, Rumblefish, and others).
165
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 12, at 57–58; DeLisa, supra note 24,
at 1276.
166
Leška, supra note 155, at 277 (noting that it “rarely happens”).
167
For example, few articles have addressed the sync right in more than passing.
See Cohen, supra note 22, at 788 (summarizing sync right law and proposing
weakening copyright owners’ claims to re-use fees); Skopicki, supra note 24, at 21
(proposing requiring sync licenses for holographic performances); DeLisa, supra note
24, at 1301–12 (proposing a compulsory license system for sync licenses).
168
See, e.g., JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 376–77 (2d ed. 2020); COHEN ET AL., supra note 29, at
416.
169
See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 30.02, 30.04 (2021).
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This lack of attention has, in part, been due to a dearth of case law on
sync rights.170 Since 1990, there have been less than two dozen judicial
opinions addressing sync rights in any detail.171 An even smaller subset
of this limited body of case law addresses the substantive sync rights, with
some cases instead addressing the terms of sync licenses172 or the viability
of sync rights for purposes of a fair use analysis.173

A. Film, Television, and Commercials
Most of the early synchronization cases involved antitrust allegations
by the film and television industries against music rights organizations.174
For example, in M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen – often understood to be the
first major case on sync rights – the plaintiffs alleged copyright
infringement of their musical work copyright and the defendants
countered that plaintiffs were engaged in anti-competitive behavior in
violation of antitrust law.175 The plaintiffs were members of ASCAP,
which adopted a uniform plan for its members to license copyrighted
music to motion picture producers for the purpose of synchronization with

170

Skopicki, supra note 24, at 15–20 (2020) (surveying the lack of case law on
sync rights).
171
Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193 (D. Mass. 2009);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 1996); Woods
v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1995); Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc.,
59 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1995); Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920
(2d Cir. 1984); Downtown Music Publ’g LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 754, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp.
2d 338, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc., 404 F. Supp.
2d 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Ohio Players, Inc. v. Polygram Records, Inc., No.
99CIV.0033, 2000 WL 1616999, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney
Co., No. 91 Civ. 0344 (LLS), 1992 WL 204343 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1992); Zomba
Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2007); Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 480–81 (6th Cir. 2003); House
of Bryant Publ’ns, LLC v. A & E Television Networks, No. 3:09-0502, 2009 WL
3673055, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d
522, 529 (9th Cir. 2008); Maljack Productions, Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp.,
81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1996); Kihn v. Bill Graham Archives, LLC, 445 F. Supp.
3d 234, 253 (N.D. Cal. 2020); EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1225 (D. Utah 2007).
172
See, e.g., Woods, 60 F.3d at 983–84 (discussing sync licenses for the song
When the Red, Red, Robin Comes Bob, Bob, Bobbin’ Along); Walt Disney, 1992 WL
204343, at *3 (regarding whether the sing-along version of a song from Pinocchio
violated the terms of the sync license).
173
See, e.g., House of Bryant, 2009 WL 3673055, at *1 (describing the plaintiff’s
prior sync licensing arrangements, including to the University of Tennessee at
Knoxville).
174
Skopicki, supra note 24, at 16–18.
175
M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Minn. 1948).
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the film to be produced.176 This plan effectively required producers to
“enter into a blanket license with ASCAP for the performance rights of the
copyrighted music integrated in sound films.”177 The defendants alleged
that ASCAP had “monopolistic control over the copyrighted films in
which their music is integrated” and that this control extended beyond that
which was granted by the Copyright Act.178 The U.S. District Court for
the District of Minnesota agreed that ASCAP’s plan constituted copyright
misuse.179 In denying recovery to the plaintiffs,180 it emphasized that
ASCAP controlled 80% of the licensing of music to films and that
“[t]hrough Ascap, these plaintiffs and their associates by a refusal to
license, or by the imposition of an exorbitant performance license fee, can
sound the death knell of every motion picture theatre in America.”181
Despite Witmark primarily focusing on copyright misuse,182 it is also
notable as one of the first cases to recognize sync rights.183 The decision
explains that a music license “permit[s] the producers to synchronize the
copyrighted music on the sound track of the motion picture film to be
produced. . . . [these] are merely synchronization rights”184 It later notes
that “it may be assumed that a copyright owner of music may have the
right to license the recording of his composition on a film and also the
exclusive right to license the performance of the synchronized
composition.”185 While on its face this distinction is between the
reproduction and public performance right, recording a composition on a
film also refers to the separate synchronization right and its distinction
from other rights held by the copyright owner.186
Starting in the 1990s, music copyright cases started to more directly
address sync rights. In Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York made explicit what was
hinted at in Witmark: “The right to print the lyrics . . . is qualitatively
different from the right to synchronize that song with a visual image.”187
176

Id.
Id. at 849.
178
Id. at 846.
179
Id. at 850 (extending the patent misuse doctrine to copyright).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 847.
182
See Roger Arar, Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1291, 1293–94 (1981) (discussing how the Witmark court applied the copyright
misuse defense).
183
Skopicki, supra note 24, at 16 (describing Witmark as one of the earliest sync
cases).
184
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 844.
185
Id. at 846.
186
Id. at 846–47.
187
Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 91 Civ. 0344, 1992 WL 204343, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1992).
177
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Three years later, in Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., the Second
Circuit faced the question of whether sound recordings had their own sync
right.188
In Agee, Paramount created an audiovisual work that
synchronized part of a duplicated sound recording to visual images of two
men perpetrating a burglary.189 Paramount tried to argue that commercial
copying for time-shifting purposes did not violate the reproduction right,
like in the seminal Supreme Court case of Sony.190 The Second Circuit
avoided this specific question, determining that Paramount had duplicated
and synchronized Agee’s sound recording to not just time-shift, but also
enhance the performance by ensuring that viewers would not see any
mistakes.191 The district court had held that there were no sync rights in a
sound recording copyright owner’s reproduction right.192 The Second
Circuit disagreed, holding that synchronizing previously recorded sounds
on the soundtrack of an audiovisual work is part of the reproduction right
granted by § 114(b) to the owner of rights in a sound recording.193
Meanwhile, courts also started to define the breadth of sync rights.
In Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers, the Second Circuit referred to sync rights as “the right to
reproduce the music onto the soundtrack of a film or a videotape in
synchronization with the action.”194 Similarly, in Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Still N The Water Publishing, the Sixth Circuit explicitly said that
synchronization licenses refer to the “use of a composition in a film, prerecorded radio or television program, or radio or television
commercial.”195

B. Video Games
The sync right cases up to this point exclusively addressed these
classic audiovisual works. One of the first cases to implicitly broaden this
definition was Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc., which addressed
whether a use of a song in a video game infringed the copyright of the

188

59 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.
190
464 U.S. 417, 447–55 (1984) (holding that recording a television program for
later viewing was a permissible time shifting that did not violate the copyright in the
program due to fair use).
191
Agee, 59 F.3d at 323–24 (2d Cir. 1995). Although the court held that
Paramount was liable for violating Agee’s sync rights, it held that the stations were
not liable for violating Agee’s sync rights, however, because they were protected by
the ephemeral recording exemption under 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). Id. at 326–27.
192
Agee, 59 F.3d at 320.
193
Id. at 322.
194
744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984).
195
327 F.3d 472, 481 n.8 (6th Cir. 2003).
189
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plaintiffs’ musical composition.196 The video game in question was Guitar
Hero, which allows players to perform well-known rock songs in time with
the music.197 The court noted that the “graphic video elements of the game
require complex synchronization with each song to enable the realistic
simulation of guitar play.”198 The defendant could sync the song with the
video game graphics because it had acquired the requisite proper sync
license from the musical work copyright owner.199 It did not have to obtain
a master use license because it had recorded a cover of each musical work,
and the plaintiffs’ sound recording copyright was therefore not
implicated.200 While this expanded the scope of sync rights, the inclusion
of video games was unsurprising, especially with a game where songs are
synched to specific timed graphics such as Guitar Hero.201

C. Karaoke
A more controversial question is whether karaoke machines require
sync licenses, on which courts have come to different conclusions. The
first court to address this question was the Second Circuit in ABKCO
Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc.202 The court recognized that “[a]
synchronization license is required if a copyrighted musical composition
is to be used in ‘timed-relation’ or synchronization with an audiovisual
work.”203 But does a device merely showing the lyrics on a screen, without
any accompanying images, implicate synchronization?204 The defendant
in the case specifically questioned whether Congress had kept pace with
technological advancements or whether the definition of “phonorecord,”
as compared to “audiovisual work,”205 was underinclusive.206 But the
196

574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
Id. at 762.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 768.
201
Id. at 762.
202
96 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1996).
203
Id. at 63 n.4.
204
Id. at 65.
205
Phonorecords are defined as “material objects in which sounds, other than
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Audiovisual works are defined as “works that
consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by
the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment,
together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.” Id.
206
ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 65. The court, however, noted that it was Congress’ role
to redefine terms in the future, not theirs. Id. This echoed concerns about copyright
197
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court concluded that this method of display constituted an audiovisual
work because it consisted “‘of a series of related images’ – the lyrics –
‘together with accompanying sounds’ – the music.”207 Therefore,
according to the ABKCO court, the use of a video image – even stock ones
such as a sun-drenched beach – and lyrics in combination with music must
first clear sync rights with the copyright owners.208
The question of sync rights and karaoke was next raised in the District
of Utah in EMI Entertainment World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc.209 In that
case, plaintiff EMI argued that karaoke machines required a sync license
as they “displayed songs’ lyrics in timed relation to music.” 210 But
defendant Priddis countered that “courts have recognized synchronization
rights only with reference to films, motion pictures, videotapes, television
programs and commercials, all of which have significant visual image
content, and that the video display of the text of song lyrics not
accompanied by such image content falls beyond the scope of
synchronization rights as defined by the existing case law.”211 The court
agreed; “a copyright holder’s synchronization right [does not] extend[] to
the graphical display of written text, without more.”212 Here, Priddis had
simply digitally reprinted copies of the lyrics,213 unlike in ABKCO, where
the karaoke disks contained lyrics and graphics.214 Without more visual
image content, the karaoke machines did not qualify as an audiovisual
work, but merely as a visual work.215 Therefore, the sync right was not
implicated and the court granted Priddis’ motion for summary judgment
on the sync license question.216
Similarly to EMI, in the Ninth Circuit case of Leadsinger, Inc. v.
BMG Music Publishing, BMG requested that karaoke companies pay for
a sync license to use their karaoke devices.217 Like in ABKCO and EMI,
the decision turned on whether the karaoke devices qualified as
audiovisual works, as the copyright owner’s sync right is their “right to
control the synchronization of musical compositions with the content of
law not keeping pace with technology and the necessity of Congress to remedy it, like
those in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908), and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974).
207
ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 65 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
208
Id. at 62–63.
209
505 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (D. Utah 2007).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 1221.
212
Id. at 1222.
213
Id. at 1223.
214
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d Cir.
1996).
215
EMI, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
216
Id. at 1225.
217
512 F.3d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 2008).
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audiovisual works.”218 The Copyright Act defines audiovisual works as
“works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any.”219 The Ninth Circuit held that karaoke devices are audiovisual works
under this definition, as the projected lyrics are “a series of related images”
that match the accompanying music.220 It disagreed with the EMI court’s
analysis, concluding that, unlike printed song lyrics, “images of song lyrics
embedded in a karaoke device are part of a series of images, and must be
shown by a machine so that the consumer knows when to sing each
lyric.”221 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that Leadsinger needed to
secure sync licenses “to display images of song lyrics in timed relation
with recorded music.”222

VI. COMPLICATIONS WITH NEW CONTENT INNOVATIONS
For most of the twentieth century, sync rights appeared to be
narrowly cabined to only include movies, television shows, and
commercials. The early cases that defined sync rights were decided
decades ago, citing sync rights exclusively for the soundtrack of a film or
a videotape.223 In EMI, the defendant argued that courts “have recognized
synchronization rights only with reference to films, motion pictures,
videotapes, television programs and commercials,” and the court
agreed.224 Even as recently as 2013, a court defined the sync right as the
right “to authorize the use of a song in a movie or commercial
soundtrack.”225 In the twenty-first century, courts started to gradually
broaden the scope of sync licenses to include media such as
advertisements, promotional videos, and video games.226 As we have
seen, courts have expressly confronted the questions of whether video

218

Id. at 527.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
220
Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 527–28.
221
Id. at 528 n.2.
222
Id. at 529.
223
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 33 n.23 (1979); Buffalo Broad.
Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920–21 (2d Cir. 1984).
224
EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221,
1224 (D. Utah. 2007).
225
Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
226
See Skopicki, supra note 24, at 18 (describing how sync cases gradually
started to address commercial advertisements).
219
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games and karaoke machines qualify as audiovisual works that necessitate
sync licenses.227
Some commentators have argued that as technology has advanced, so
have courts’ definitions of audiovisual works, but, at their core, these types
of works are very similar to the traditional audiovisual works of film and
television programs.228 Once courts started to face questions further afield
from the core of audiovisual works, uniformity of understanding around
what constituted an audiovisual work started to break down.229 For
example, the District of Utah and the Ninth Circuit are at odds over
whether a text-only karaoke machine requires a sync license.230 While
sync rights’ relationship with karaoke machines – a machine invented over
fifty years ago231 – is still being worked out, novel technologies and forms
of audiovisual content have arisen which pose new questions for sync
rights. While movie or television show soundtracks clearly require a sync
license, it is less apparent whether new types of media would require
one.232
Perhaps the most significant question about synchronization and
technology at the moment is whether sync licenses are required for all
forms of streamed content. For truly live streams that are in real time and
not recorded, the work is not reproduced and therefore doesn’t implicate

Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (E.D. Mich.
2008); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 1996);
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 2008); EMI, 505
F. Supp. 2d at 1222. Zomba Ent., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 578
(6th Cir. 2007) (addressing whether copying lyrics on the screen for karaoke in sync
with songs was fair). Another sync case that addressed karaoke machines was Zomba
Enterprises, Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., but that case instead addressed whether
copying lyrics on the screen for karaoke in sync with songs was fair use. The court
held that it was not. 491 F.3d 574, 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
228
See Skopicki, supra note 24, at 24–26 (arguing that courts have increasingly
taken a broad interpretation of what constitutes an audiovisual work and that
holograms should qualify as such).
229
Id. at 30.
230
EMI, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (holding that sync licenses were not necessary
for karaoke machines that featured only digitized text, as the work was not sufficiently
audiovisual); Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 528 (holding that karaoke machines were
sufficiently audiovisual because the machines used images, even if the images were
solely song lyrics).
231
Matt Alt, The Man Who Invented Karaoke Is 95 and His Machine Still Works,
KOTAKU (June 26, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://kotaku.com/the-man-who-inventedkaraoke-is-95-and-his-machine-stil-1844154550
[https://perma.cc/8YLL-A3UR]
(explaining that Daisuke Inoue is often credited as the inventor of the first karaoke
machine in 1971, but Shigeichi Negishi was actually the first inventor of the machine
in 1967).
232
COHEN ET AL., supra note 2929, at 416.
227

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/6

30

Goodyear: Synchronizing Copyright and Technology: A New Paradigm for Sync R

2022]

A NEW PARADIGM FOR SYNC RIGHTS

125

the copyright owner’s exclusive sync rights.233 But any time there is a
reproduction, such as with a movie, TV show, commercial, or other
audiovisual work with music in timed-relation, there must be a sync
license.234 The same would appear to be true for online audiovisual
content.235 Therefore, if the work is later posted or can be replayed, the
creator almost certainly requires a sync license.236
This distinction between live and recorded streams has become
especially important during the COVID-19 pandemic, when traditionally
live events such as concerts, DJ sets, and fitness classes have moved
online.237 Even before the pandemic, streaming content such as video
games and online workout classes was starting to become popular.238 For
example, the rise of at-home fitness classes from entities such as Peloton
and Mirror have expanded the types of uses that potentially require sync
licenses.239 If sync rights apply to these types of works, these entities and
others that post recorded content that happens to contain music online

Gregory Pryor & Eric Zwilling, Reed Smith’s Guide to Live Streaming U.S.
Edition REED SMITH 20 (Apr. 2020); Seale, supra note 5 (arguing that a pure
livestream, which is not archived, would not require a sync license because the work
is not fixed (it disappears after the performance is over)). A pure livestream would,
however, require a musical composition public performance license. Seale, supra note
5. But see Jon Blistein, Twitch Licenses Music Now. But the Music Industry Says It’s
Skirting the Rules, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:06 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/twitch-soundtrack-licensing-sync1069411 [https://perma.cc/6V32-HBQP] (According to Noah Downs, a lawyer, “[t]he
idea that playing music during a livestream does not require a synchronization license
is wrong. It’s bad interpretation of copyright law. . . . because the music is definitely
synchronized in timed relation with images and video.”).
234
Pryor & Zwilling, supra note 233, at 20.
235
Id.
236
Pryor & Zwilling, supra note 233, at 20; Brandit & Tibbs, supra note 3
(proposing that if an artist uploads their video for playback, they need not only a public
performance license, but also a sync license, which gives the licensee permission to
pair a video with music and save it for playing on demand.); Seale, supra note 5
(arguing that an archived livestream, on the other hand, requires both a sync license
and, if a sound recording is used, a master use license.).
237
Jess Cording, How COVID-19 Is Transforming the Fitness Industry, FORBES
(July
13,
2020,
4:07
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jesscording/2020/07/13/covid-19-transforming-fitnessindustry/?sh=57436c7b30a7.
238
See id. (“virtual workouts were in existence prior to the COVID-19
pandemic”); Adam Epstein, How Watching Other People Play Video Games Took
Over the World, QUARTZ, https://qz.com/1985927/how-video-game-streaming-tookover-the-world [https://perma.cc/ZV8W-73D3] (last updated Mar. 29, 2021).
239
Sekou Campbell, Peloton Suit Shows Sync Licensing Is Next Copyright
Horizon,
LAW360
(Feb.
19,
2020,
1:35
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1244986/peloton-suit-shows-sync-licensing-isnext-copyright-horizon [https://perma.cc/CBS2-MKV8].
233
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would have to undertake the onerous sync licensing process,240 which
could chill the content we have come to experience – and expect – online.
This ambiguity about how far sync rights reach has even contributed
to nefarious attempts of police officers to “weaponize” copyright.241 There
have been reports of officers playing copyrighted music during potentially
contentious altercations.242 The logic is that if they are recorded, those
recordings will contain copyrighted music, which will trigger song
recognition software on major platforms such as YouTube and Instagram
that will cause them to be taken down.243 This practice has become
common enough that some law enforcement departments have even
instructed their officers to engage in this so-called “copyright hacking.”244
In addition to the question of how far sync rights stretch, new content
forms also face an onerous battle to obtain sync licenses for their
purposes.245 Unlike recordings of artists playing music, which can rely on
compulsory reproduction licenses under § 115, recorded audiovisual
events, even candid ones, must rely on individually negotiated sync
licenses.246 There are no compulsory licenses for sync rights either, which

240

See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Latest Anti-Accountability Move By Cops Involves
Playing Music While Being Recorded In Hopes Of Triggering Copyright Takedowns,
TECHDIRT
(Feb.
10,
2021,
9:31
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210209/19152846222/latest-anti-accountabilitymove-cops-involves-playing-music-while-being-recorded-hopes-triggeringcopyright-takedowns.shtml [https://perma.cc/YTK5-3M88].
242
Id.; Sarah Rose Sharp, Cop Admits to Playing Copyrighted Music to Keep
Activist Recording off Youtube,
HYPERALLERGIC
(July 2,
2021),
https://hyperallergic.com/660912/cop-plays-copyrighted-taylor-swift-music-to-keepactivist-recording-off-youtube [https://perma.cc/65KF-3K93].
243
Tim Cushing, Law Enforcement Officer Openly Admits He’s Playing
Copyrighted Music To Prevent Citizen's Recording From Being Uploaded To
YouTube,
TECHDIRT
(July
6,
2021,
9:41
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210702/11260847107/law-enforcement-officeropenly-admits-hes-playing-copyrighted-music-to-prevent-citizens-recording-beinguploaded-to-youtube.shtml [https://perma.cc/HG23-WQ6B].
244
See, e.g., Matthew Gault, Cop Was Instructed to Use Music to Disrupt
Filming,
VICE
(Sept.
9,
2021,
9:39
AM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/93y77y/cop-was-instructed-to-use-music-to-disruptfilming?utm_medium=social&utm_source=motherboardtv_facebook&fbclid=IwAR
1XmtBjaqjqiShWsmvoykryhQACoIxEmjTfcpi7a8QXh6nZ9VCZdpjWrwY
[https://perma.cc/55RZ-EVZV]; Tim Cushing, Officer Claims Sheriff's Office Told
Him To Play Copyrighted Music To Shut Down Citizens’ Recordings, TECHDIRT
(Sept.
13,
2021,
11:58
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210911/21360647545/officer-claims-sheriffsoffice-told-him-to-play-copyrighted-music-to-shut-down-citizens-recordings.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TD4G-4T73].
245
Campbell, supra note 239.
246
Id.
241
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means the copyright owner can reject a use that would have likely been
allowed to proceed in a different medium through compulsory licenses and
collective rights organizations.247
The necessity of individually
negotiating these sync licenses generates significant transaction costs,
especially for smaller content creators that may not have the time or
resources to ascertain, contact, and obtain rights from the relevant
copyright owners.248
While sync licenses can pose a significant burden to old and new
audiovisual content generators alike, the online streaming world faces
additional obstacles: short lead time and limited time use.249 For example,
in a recent case involving Peloton, the fitness company articulated how
modern uses of music square poorly with extant sync licensing
processes.250 Peloton explained that “[b]ecause instructors provide
Peloton with limited notice of the music that they intend to play in class,
Peloton . . . is ‘ill-suited’ to the ‘traditional’ method by which music
publishers license rights to third parties for use in derivative works with
audio and visual components.”251 This lack of advance notice and need to
negotiate rights quickly makes obtaining sync rights almost impossible for
uses such as Peloton’s.
Another problem is the limited time and use usually negotiated under
sync licenses. Sync licenses typically specify the work in which the music
will be included, the media where it will be offered, and the time period
during which it will be offered, and are thus limited licenses.252 If a user
negotiates a license for a specific segment of Video A, they could not then
use that license to justify their inclusion of that song on another segment
in Video A or in Video B, unless of course they specifically contracted for
that.253 This has manifested itself as a problem, for example, where old
television programs are reshown on streaming services.254 These shows

247

See supra Part IV(b).
Yu, supra note 161, at 387, 393 (“As the need for performance and
synchronization licenses in the digital environment continues to grow, transaction
costs are likely to substantially increase.”).
249
Nelson, supra note 18.
250
Downtown Music Publ’g LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 754,
760 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
251
Id.
252
Vlad Kushnir, Legal and Practical Aspects of Music Licensing for Motion
Pictures, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 71, 82 (2005) (describing the “limited videogram
license” clause usually present in sync license agreements).
253
Yu, supra note 161, at 392 (“[I]t is understood that a synchronization license
granted for Video A may not be used for Video B”).
254
David Oxenford, Missing Music on Streamed TV Programs Highlights Rights
Issues for Podcasters and Video Producers, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2021/04/articles/missing-music-on-streamed-tvprograms-highlights-rights-issues-for-podcasters-and-video-producers/#page=1
248
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are now missing music that was featured on the original broadcast due to
the original sync licenses only covering over-the-air broadcasts or short
periods of time.255 Such restrictions on sync licenses in contracts have
limited the exploitation of audiovisual works by their creators.256
Finally, the uncertainty of when sync rights apply to these new forms
of content has caused over-enforcement and apprehension about being
liable for copyright infringement.257 In the online video game streaming
space, gamers record and upload streams of themselves playing video
games as video on demand (“VOD”).258 These VODs may be muted if
they appear to violate the sync rights through playing not just music in the
background, but even through just playing in-game music, which is of
course embedded in the game itself.259 In addition to the risk of having
one’s content blocked, the monetary penalties for sync right violations can
be enormous.260 This is due to the amount of statutory damages that can
be available to the copyright owner, which can be as high as $150,000 per
infringement.261 This can lead to enormous claims, such as those of
several music publishers against Peloton, where they claimed $300 million
in damages for Peloton’s use of more than 2,000 musical works in their
online fitness classes.262
To contract around these problems, some online platforms have
negotiated agreements with musical work and sound recording copyright
owners.263 Most notably, YouTube and Meta both have content
identification (“Content ID”) and management systems, as well as
arrangements with major music publishers that cover at least some sync
rights.264 But other platforms, such as Twitch, lack such blanket sync
[https://perma.cc/AAH9-V4XA] (explaining why old TV programs on streaming
services are missing their original accompanying music).
255
Id.
256
Id. (describing how sync rights issues have delayed or limited the
introduction of old television programs onto streaming outlets).
257
Id.
258
Nelson, supra note 18.
259
Id.
260
17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
261
Id. (stipulating that for non-willful acts of infringement, the copyright owner
shall receive $750-$30,000, and for willful acts, up to $150,000).
262
Second Amended Complaint, Downtown Music Publ’g LLC v. Peloton
Interactive, Inc., 19-cv-02426, 2019 WL 8621796, at ¶ 1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019).
The case later settled in February 2020. Bill Donahue, Peloton Ends Copyright War
with Music
Publishers, LAW360
(Feb.
27, 2020, 10:55
AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1248063 [https://perma.cc/C94N-SVHM].
263
Seale, supra note 5.
264
Id.; Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1512, 1519 (2008) (“All of the major labels have struck partnership deals with
YouTube, some even allowing the synchronization of recordings from the label’s
collection into user-generated videos.”).
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license agreements.265 While such high-level arrangements can streamline
creation, they only provide access to some works and only on select
(generally, well-funded) platforms.266 Significant sync obstacles remain
for prospective creators.
To address these obstacles, some commentators have suggested
strategies for limiting the reach of sync rights. 267 For example, attorneys
have proposed that consumers self-sync music in workout classes.268
Others have recommended that Congress set up a mechanical licensing
collective for administering sync licenses.269 Meanwhile, others still have
suggested utilizing the existing defense of fair use.270
But these suggestions are limited in the assistance they provide. Selfsynching music provides an end run around sync rights for purposes such
as fitness classes, but not other novel uses such as documentaries or online,
downloadable video recordings of radio shows.271 A mechanical licensing
collective that would cover sync licenses may be a promising dream, but
at present, that is all it is; it would need to be established by Congress. Fair
use is potentially the most promising of these three suggested solutions.
The synchronization of music as background in a film can, on occasion,
qualify as fair use.272 For example, in Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a
movie studio’s use of only fifteen seconds and ten words from John
265

Blistein, supra note 233. Twitch did reach an agreement with the National
Music Publishers’ Association (“NMPA”) in September 2021, but that agreement did
not establish a license for Twitch users, but instead created a new reporting process
for infringing content. NMPA and Twitch Announce Agreement, NMPA (Sept. 21,
2021),
https://www.nmpa.org/nmpa-and-twitch-announce-agreement
[https://perma.cc/ZTB4-RH5R]. Before the agreement, music publishers submitted
thousands of DMCA complaints to Twitch over violations of music copyrights. See
Timothy Geigner, Twitch Manages to Get Out Some ‘Disappointment’ With Music
Industry Over Latest Round of DMCA Claims, TECHDIRT (June 3, 2021, 8:08 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210603/11085146924/twitch-manages-to-getout-some-disappointment-with-music-industry-over-latest-round-dmca-claims.shtml
[https://perma.cc/CN9L-XRW7].
266
Campbell, supra note 239.
267
Id.
268
See, e.g., id.
269
See, e.g., id.; DeLisa, supra note 24, at 1301 (arguing in favor of a
compulsory sync license, at least for user-generated content platforms).
270
See, e.g., Storch, Morrison, & Bernard, supra note 20, at 5 (“Use of short
sound clips alongside images in a talk on copyright or a lecture on music and art at a
scholarly society would be classic examples of fair use, and subject to powerful fair
use arguments.”).
271
See Campbell, supra note 239 (noting that Peloton could allow users to selfsync their playlists, but not addressing this option (or rather, the lack thereof) in other
contexts).
272
Lee, supra note 264, at 1528, 1530 (“Even the synchronization of music as
background in a film sometimes is fair use.”).
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Lennon’s song “Imagine” was intended to criticize the song and its stance
on religion, and thus was transformative and a fair use.273 However, fair
use is very fact-specific and can be difficult to predict accurately due to its
ex post facto nature.274 In addition, few cases have been decided on sync
rights in general,275 let alone on fair use and sync rights together. No cases
to date have directly decided whether a sync license is unnecessary
because the use is fair.276 This makes fair use a potential, but largely
undefined and uncertain path forward.
These shortcomings leave broad sync rights largely intact. The
uncertainty of whether sync rights apply to these new content forms and
the difficulties in licensing for them jeopardize their viability. Sync rights
were defined for the twentieth century world of film and television. While
academic and judicial commentary on sync rights has been lacking, further
analysis is critical to preserving streaming and other novel content forms
against the constraints of sync rights. Instead of contracting around them,
sync rights themselves must be reinterpreted against the background of
recent technological adaptations, following in the tradition of adapting
copyright to new technological innovations to create more precise and
progressive rights.

VII. RE-CRAFTING A MODERN SYNC RIGHT TEST
New forms of audiovisual content follow a long line of innovations
in media and expressive arts. As with player pianos, cable TV, and

273

556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). However, this case just
discussed the broader musical work and sound recording rights rather than sync rights
specifically. Id.
274
See Michael P. Goodyear, Fair Use, the Internet Age, and Rulifying the
Blogosphere, 61 IDEA 1, 6, 13 (2020) (explaining how fair use decisions can be
difficult to predict and can even be contradictory due to their ex post, compared to ex
ante, nature).
275
See supra Part V.
276
See, e.g., Lee v. Karaoke, 18-cv-8633-KM-SCM, 2019 WL 2537932, at *8
n.9 (D.N.J. June 19, 2019) (“The moving defendants’ motion only addresses public
performance. I confine my analysis to that aspect, and do not independently address
synchronization.”); Lee v. Karaoke City, No. 18 CIV. 3895 (PAE), 2020 WL 5105176,
at *5 n.3 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 31, 2020) (Aug. 31, 2020) (“Defendants also contend that
Lee lacks standing because only producers and distributors, and not owners, can sue
for infringement of ‘synch rights,’ namely the right to reproduce copyrighted lyrics on
a karaoke screen. But defendants did not raise this argument in their motion to dismiss
briefs. It is thus inappropriate for the Court to consider it here.”) (internal citations
omitted); Threshold Media Corp. v. Relativity Media, LLC, No. CV1009218DMGAJWX, 2013 WL 12331550, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013) (discussing
the synchronization license market in determining whether a use was fair, but only for
the purpose of determining whether the use usurped the existing market for the
copyrighted sound recording).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/6

36

Goodyear: Synchronizing Copyright and Technology: A New Paradigm for Sync R

2022]

A NEW PARADIGM FOR SYNC RIGHTS

131

photocopiers,277 these novel technologies raise important questions and
concerns about the breadth and limitations of extant copyright law.
Audiovisual works have expanded far beyond the movies and television
shows for which sync rights were originally licensed.278 By reinvigorating
the “timed-relation” prong of the sync rights test, courts can achieve the
goal of copyright: a greater balance between rightsholders’ exclusive
rights and public access to musical works and sound recordings.
Historically, sync rights were implicated by film and television, and
the courts referred to the rights as such.279 As explained above in Part V,
until the late 1990s, sync rights cases only involved these traditional
audiovisual works.280 But even as late as 2013, the Southern District of
New York still explained that sync rights refer to the right “to authorize
the use of a song in a movie or commercial soundtrack.”281
In addition to the focus on film and television for sync rights, courts
have also primarily focused on whether the use of music is contained in an
audiovisual work. For example, in Agee, the court found that Agee had
created an audiovisual work by playing a sound recording while a video
of two burglars appeared on the screen.282 The karaoke cases also grappled
with this question.283 In ABKCO, the Second Circuit held that karaoke
machines were audiovisual works because they consisted “‘of a series of
related images’ – the lyrics – ‘together with accompanying sounds’ – the
music.”284 The Ninth Circuit agreed in Leadsinger,285 but in EMI the
District of Utah held that karaoke machines were only visual works rather
than audiovisual works.286 This focus on what qualifies as an audiovisual

277

See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.
279
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 33 n.23 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The ‘synch’ right is the right to record a copyrighted song in
synchronization with the film or videotape, and is obtained separately from the right
to perform the music.”); Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir.
1984) (describing the synch right as “the right to reproduce the music onto the
soundtrack of a film or a videotape in synchronization with the action”).
280
See supra notes 174–95 and accompanying text.
281
Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
282
Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1995).
283
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101); EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp.
2d 1217, 1223 (D. Utah 2007); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522,
528 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).
284
See ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 65 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
285
See EMI, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
286
See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 528.
278
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work may, in part, stem from the fact that audiovisual works are defined
in the Copyright Act.287
Yet, case law has developed what is in effect a two-part test, the
second part of which (timed-relation) has been largely ignored by
courts.288 Courts have included this aspect of synchronization in their
definition of sync rights.289 In ABKCO, the Second Circuit recognized that
“[a] synchronization license is required if a copyrighted musical
composition is to be used in ‘timed-relation’ or synchronization with an
audiovisual work.”290 Other courts around the United States have
followed suit. In EMI, the District of Utah cited to ABKCO for this
definition of when a sync license is required.291 In Leadsinger, the Ninth
Circuit also quoted language from ABKCO.292
The District of
Massachusetts similarly determined that “synch rights are an additional
right that a user must acquire when it seeks not only to perform the
protected work but also to use it in timed-relation with an audiovisual
work.”293
These definitions, in effect, create a two-step test: to necessitate a
sync license, compared to just a reproduction license, the use (1) must be
a reproduction in an audiovisual work and (2) must play the music in
timed-relation to moving images.294 While courts have liberally quoted
the language from ABKCO, however, they have rarely considered how this
language mentions two elements. One of the rare exceptions is the EMI
court.295 It recognized that the karaoke machine at issue in the case played
music in timed-relation with the projected lyrics.296 This is logical, as the
lyrics were intended to display exactly in line with where they appeared in
the music.297 The court determined, however, that although the images
were being shown in timed-relation, the karaoke machine did not
constitute an audiovisual work.298 Since the machine was not an

Audiovisual works are “works that consist of a series of related images which
are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
288
See ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 62 n.4.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 527.
292
EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1195 (D.
Utah 2007).
293
Steele v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 185, 193 (D. Mass. 2009).
294
See ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 62 n.4
295
EMI, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
296
Id. at 1219.
297
Id.
298
Id. at 1224.
287
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audiovisual work – thus failing the first prong of the sync rights test – it
failed to implicate sync rights.299
While audiovisual works are defined by statute and have been
discussed in detail by courts,300 the meaning of timed-relation is much
murkier at present. There are two possible definitions. Timed-relation
could refer to music played at the same time as visual images are present.
But this meaning would at least partially overlap with the meaning given
to audiovisual works under the Copyright Act: “works that consist of a
series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown . . .
together with accompanying sounds.”301 Such a reading of timed-relation
would run against a central cannon of legal interpretation, the rule against
surplusage, under which, if possible, every word and provision of a statute
is to be given independent meaning.302
The more likely reading, therefore, is that timed-relation adds some
additional element to an audiovisual work. Renowned copyright
practitioners and scholars Melville and David Nimmer have asked, “[d]oes
a synchronization require timing with visual content?”303 The answer is
yes, timed-relation should include an intent element. Timed-relation can
better be defined as where the creator of the audiovisual work specifically
lines up separate images to an accompanying music file.
Some have pushed back against this intent-based reading. For
example, some observers have interpreted timed-relation to refer broadly
to “sound recordings and audiovisual components presented to an
audience of viewer concurrently and in unison.”304 At least according to
one court, any violation of the copyright owner’s reproduction right
deserves the label “synchronization.”305 In Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox
Radio, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that synchronization does not require “including a musical
299

Id. at 1223.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); see, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g,
512 F.3d 522, 527–29 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a karaoke device falls within the
definition of an audiovisual work); EMI, 505 F. Supp. at 1222–23 (discussing whether
a karaoke machine constitutes an audiovisual work).
301
17 U.S.C. § 101.
302
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) (“The Court will avoid an
interpretation of a statute that ‘renders some words altogether redundant.’”) (quoting
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995)); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (“Statutory interpretations that ‘render superfluous other
provisions in the same enactment’ are strongly disfavored.”); see also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW app. B, at 440 (2012) (“[I]f possible,
every word and every provision is to be given effect.”).
303
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.06[A][5] n.47 (2021).
304
Skopicki, supra note 24, at 16 n.92.
305
Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551, 552 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
300
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work on the soundtrack of an audiovisual work, ‘synchronized’ to the
action on the video recording,” because synchronization is really just “the
right to reproduce the music onto the soundtrack of a film or a videotape
in synchronization with the action.”306 But this very broad definition has
only been followed in one other case, an unpublished and noncitable
California state court opinion.307 The majority of courts have instead
interpreted the synchronization right as parallel to the reproduction right,
noting that reproduction licenses are distinct from sync licenses.308 A
broad reading of sync rights such as that in Freeplay Music also reads out
any meaning in the term timed-relation, improperly conflating the terms
audiovisual work and timed-relation.
The two-part test with a robust timed-relation definition frees up
creative opportunities. For example, under this test, a streamed,
downloadable fitness class involving bodyweight and free weight
exercises would likely not necessitate a sync license. The video of the
class would qualify as an audiovisual work, as it has both images and
music. But it would not meet the definition for timed-relation. The trainer
may have selected the songs he or she wanted to play to galvanize his or
her viewers, but it is unlikely that he or she coordinated exact movements
during each of the notes in the songs. Instead of a sync license, a
reproduction license would still be required, which could be easier to
acquire than a sync license, especially for mechanical reproductions
through a Section 115 license or a license from the Harry Fox Agency.
On the other hand, works that depend on timed-relation between
visuals and music would be captured by this definition of timed-relation.
For example, fitness classes such as Zumba or SoulCycle depend in large
part on the coordination of movements to music. Zumba involves dancing
to Latin and World music, following an instructor to perform specific
moves in time with the music.309 SoulCycle also requires attendees to
match the speed of the music’s beat and to follow the instructor’s

306

Id.
Steiner v. CBS Broad., No. B190839, 2007 WL 2178542, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 31, 2007).
308
See, e.g., EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1217,
1219 (D. Utah 2007) (noting that the defendant already paid for reproduction licenses
but at issue was whether they also had to pay for sync licenses); Leadsinger, Inc. v.
BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that in addition to its
§ 115 compulsory reproduction license, Leadsinger also had to secure sync licenses).
309
See Classes, ZUMBA, https://www.zumba.com/en-US/pages/class
[https://perma.cc/6X2J-FV9E] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“We take the ‘work’ out of
workout, by mixing low-intensity and high-intensity moves for an interval-style,
calorie-burning dance fitness party. Once the Latin and World rhythms take over,
you’ll see why Zumba® Fitness classes are often called exercise in disguise.”).
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choreography.310 This involves both a visual of the instructor and onscreen instructions for how fast to bike. Both exercise classes would seem
to fit squarely inside this definition of timed-relation.
In a very different setting, a video stream of an in-studio radio show
would not meet the timed-relation definition. A streamed, downloadable
video of a radio show would be fixed and qualify as an audiovisual work.
However, the music playing on the radio show is not lined up beat-by-beat
with any images on the video. Therefore, while the radio station hosts are
reproducing a song, their actions should not implicate a sync right as
compared to a reproduction one.
Another example of a use that would be permissible under this timedrelation definition is incidental or background use of music. Documentary
filmmakers or the press, for example, often film live scenes.311 These
scenes may involve background music playing during an interview in a
coffee shop or while filming an interaction on the street.312 The director
or filmmaker likely did not choose to have these exact songs playing in the
background; instead, they were merely playing by chance. This sort of
recorded scene would, at present, necessitate a sync license, but, under the
proposed timed-relation definition, it would not. Similarly, in response to
police officers playing copyrighted music to trigger takedowns,313 a sync
license would not be required under this definition of timed-relation.
This robust timed-relation definition achieves a better balance
between rights holders and public access. At present, sync rights are
required for a wide array of digital content. The crux of courts’ analysis
on sync rights has been on whether the work constitutes an audiovisual
work.314 Yet, despite the synchronization label, users do not always time
310

Who We Are, SOULCYCLE, https://www.soul-cycle.com/our-story
[https://perma.cc/4BFF-4D5M] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“Set in a dark candlelit
room to high-energy music, our riders move in unison as a pack to the beat and follow
the signature choreography of our instructors.”).
311
See Peter Biesterfeld, Unscripted Storytelling: Finding the Story in
Documentary,
VIDEOMAKER,
https://www.videomaker.com/howto/documentary/unscripted-storytelling-finding-the-story-in-documentary
[https://perma.cc/YVF9-W6VD] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“Thus, independent nonfiction stories are typically shot without knowing what comes next, let alone how the
film will end.”).
312
See KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, TALES FROM THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: BOUND BY LAW? 7–9 (2006) (for several example scenarios of when a
filmmaker may want to capture live music that they themselves did not choose to
play).
313
See supra notes 24241–44 and accompanying text.
314
See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 527–29 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding a “karaoke device” to be an audiovisual work); Beastie Boys v.
Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that an online
promotional video constituted an audiovisual work); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g,
Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that a videogame was an
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the visual images to the licensed music.315 Emphasizing and reimagining
the timed-relation requirement adds back this crucial element of intent,
which has not been considered in evaluating whether novel forms of media
implicate sync rights, as compared to reproduction rights. This would
allow content creators to forego complicated and prohibitive sync
licensing and permit those works that innocently contain background
music and those that sync rights were not originally intended to cover.
This intent-driven definition of timed-relation fulfills the original
purpose of copyright, as it has been achieved by courts and legislatures for
decades when confronting new technologies. Emphasizing the second
element of the sync rights test does not add a new test that would
imbalance copyright; instead, it brings to light an element that has long
remained in the shadows of music copyright jurisprudence. This element
is important for guarding against an overexpansion of sync rights beyond
the type of uses – such as television shows and movies – which were
originally intended to be covered by synchronization. Like the courts and
Congresses of prior decades, reinvigorating this rule strikes a balance
between preserving the sync rights given to copyright owners and ensuring
public access to more works, the overarching goal of copyright.

VIII. CONCLUSION
With the proliferation of new media that could implicate sync rights,
the time is ripe for courts to acknowledge and provide guidance on the
two-part sync rights test. Music copyright is mired in a web of overlapping
rights and licensing structures, and sync rights are perhaps the most
obfuscated. Even fairly simple new media that possibly implicate sync
rights, such as karaoke machines, have led to dissimilar outcomes in
different courts. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to more events and
entertainment moving online in saved and downloadable video format,
posing additional licensing obligations for a myriad of industries.
The solution can be achieved by looking back and applying the
complete rule that courts intended. While courts have largely focused on
whether a use creates an audiovisual work, that is only one part of the test.
By analyzing the second part of sync rights – timed-relation – courts can
follow in the historical approach of achieving the goal of balance in
copyright protection and public access. The two-part test checks for
copyright infringement, but does not inhibit any existing defenses, such as
fair use, that can be and should remain important limitations on the
overextension of copyright. It also does not change the other exclusive
rights of the musical work or sound recording copyright owner, who can
audiovisual work); EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Priddis Music, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1217,
1225 (D. Utah 2007) (holding that a karaoke machine was not an audiovisual work).
315
Yu, supra note 161, at 392.
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continue to enforce infringements of their broader reproduction right.
Understanding and utilizing this long misunderstood test to the full
presents a positive advancement in interpreting and protecting both music
copyright and novel forms of media in the twenty-first century.
***
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